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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey,1 commentators and courts have struggled with the 
implications of the decision and its various, fractured opinions.
Criminal law practitioners, academics, and jurists, as well as
Supreme Court observers, have become familiar with the Court’s 
oft-quoted conclusion that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”2  The rule announced in 
Apprendi may seem straightforward, but the question of how far the 
† Teaching Fellow, Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law 
Center.  B.A. 1998, Augustana College (Sioux Falls); J.D. 2001, University of Iowa 
College of Law.  Law Clerk, Hon. Donald P. Lay, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, 2001-2002.  The author would like to especially thank Kevin 
Gregorius for his helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id. at 490.
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principle underlying that rule should extend proves more elusive.3
This is reflected, to some extent, in the difference of opinion that 
exists as to whether the decision in Apprendi represented a
transformation in the law at all.  While some suggest the Court’s 
pronouncement constituted a sea change in its approach to
criminal law,4 others insist the Court was merely restating the law as 
it had existed for some time.5  This term, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court heard its first Apprendi-based challenge in State v. Grossman.6
In Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme Court significantly restricted the 
degree of freedom previously enjoyed by legislatures to decide 
which facts constituted the essential elements of a crime and which 
were merely sentencing enhancements to be considered by the 
judge during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial.7  The case 
arose from an incident in 1994 when Charles Apprendi was 
arrested for firing several shots into the home of an African
American family who had recently moved into his neighborhood.
Apprendi received ten years in prison for possession of a firearm 
for unlawful purposes, but was also given two additional years based 
on the sentencing judge’s finding “that the crime was motivated by 
racial bias.”8  Under the New Jersey scheme, the judge’s finding 
needed only to be based on a preponderance of the evidence.9  In a 
5-4 decision written by Justice Stevens, the court concluded that 
“[i]t is ‘unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury 
the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.  It is equally 
3. See Alan Michaels, Truth in Conviction: Understanding and Evaluating
Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 320, 324 (2000) (arguing the court’s narrow 
rule-based approach was preferable to enacting a grand (but likely unenforceable) 
“standard” or doing nothing at all).
4. Justice O’Connor is probably the most notable member of this group, 
referring to the decision as a “watershed change in constitutional law.” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  For further discussion of the extent to 
which Apprendi represents a change in constitutional criminal procedure, see infra
Part III.C.
5. See, e.g., Robert S. Lewis, Note, Preventing the Tail From Wagging the Dog: 
Why Apprendi’s Bark is Worse Than Its Bite, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 625 (2001) 
(concluding that Apprendi “did not actually state a new rule of constitutional law,” 
but “merely synthesized existing case law into a clear, concise rule”).
6. 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001).
7. Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at 59.
8. State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) 
(quoting the sentencing judge).
9. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472-73.
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clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.’”10  “Simply put, the Court found it violates due 
process as well as the Sixth Amendment to convict a person for one 
crime but punish him or her for another.”11
The decision in Apprendi dealt with “a core issue” in criminal
law—the constitutional limitations on legislatures’ power to define 
the elements of a given crime.12  Thus, it is not surprising that the 
decision raised a number of questions about our current approach 
to sentencing13 and brought a great deal of judicial attention to an 
area of law previously considered to be the near exclusive province 
of the legislative branch.14  As the Court demonstrated this past 
term, it has not yet finished fine-tuning this area of the law.15
Nevertheless, the task of faithfully applying the Court’s decision in 
the myriad contexts in which it arises inevitably falls to the state and 
lower federal courts.
In December 2001, the Minnesota Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in State v. Grossman,16 applying the Apprendi
decision for the first time.  This case presented the court with a 
relatively simple decision.  The sentencing enhancement at issue 
quite clearly violated Apprendi because it increased the maximum 
10. Id. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) 
(opinion of Stevens, J.)).
11. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Review, TRIAL, Nov. 2000, at 102.
12. Michaels, supra note 3, at 320; see also Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of 
Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 776-77 (2002).
13. Justice Breyer’s dissent (and to some extent O’Connor’s) was concerned 
with the practical impact of the decision on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
and other guided discretion sentencing schemes. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555-66
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. See Douglas A. Berman, Appraising and Appreciating Apprendi, 12 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 303, 303 (2000) (stating that “most . . . reforms to state and 
federal sentencing systems have been legislative developments driven principally 
by policy considerations rather than constitutional concerns”); see also Nancy J. 
King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1468-69 (2001).
While some may approach this as an exercise in apportioning power between the 
legislative and judicial branches, at least one commentator has suggested that it is 
more appropriate to view the cases in this area as apportioning responsibilities 
between the judge and jury. See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 
GEO. L.J. 387, 392 (2002).
15. This past term, the Supreme Court heard three Apprendi-related appeals 
despite the absence of a circuit split or clear inconsistencies in the application of 
Apprendi by state courts of last resort. See infra Part III.  As of the writing of this 
article, there are no Apprendi-based claims on the Court’s 2002-03 docket, but it is 
safe to assume at least one will make it there within the next few years.
16. 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001).
3
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available sentence based on findings made by the sentencing court 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  This article will look at the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Grossman with an eye 
toward the issues that may yet arise as a result of Apprendi and 
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, potential legislative and 
judicial responses, and specifically those developments unique to 
Minnesota.
Part II describes in detail the decision in Grossman, focusing on 
any discernable indications of how the Minnesota Supreme Court 
views this developing area of the law.  Part III looks briefly at some 
of the other developments in the law post-Apprendi, including the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Harris v. United States,17 Ring v. 
Arizona,18 and United States v. Cotton.19  Part IV then identifies some 
potential issues and challenges that lie ahead for attorneys and the 
courts.  Finally, I conclude that, like many courts, the Minnesota 
appellate courts will move cautiously when considering due process 
and Sixth Amendment challenges to state sentencing statutes.  It is 
always possible that the Minnesota Supreme Court will be forced to 
apply Apprendi and its progeny to unique and unexpected
circumstances. For the time being, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has indicated its willingness to take a lead in this area, and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has resisted the urge to be
unnecessarily creative.
II. STATE V. GROSSMAN
In November 1998, Jay Grossman agreed to give R.C., a young 
woman whom he had never met before, a ride home from Moose 
Country, a restaurant in Lilydale, Minnesota.  After dropping off a 
member of his own party, Grossman stopped the car in the vicinity 
of R.C.’s friend’s townhouse.  R.C. identified a vehicle parked 
outside as belonging to one of her friends.  As they got out of the 
car, however, Grossman struck R.C. in the face, knocking her 
unconscious.  When R.C. regained consciousness, she found herself 
in a field with Grossman on top, raping her.  When she tried to 
scream, Grossman put his hands over her mouth, repeatedly
punched her, and began to choke her.  He stopped only after R.C. 
17. 122 S. Ct. 2406 (2002).
18. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
19. 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002).
4
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pretended to be dead.  After raping her again, Grossman then left 
R.C. lying in the field where she waited approximately thirty
minutes before she dared move to get help.20  R.C. suffered, among 
other things, a fractured rib, a torn lingular frenelum (the tissue 
attaching the tongue to the bottom of the mouth), and numerous 
scratches and abrasions.21  At trial, Grossman confessed to beating
R.C. and causing her injuries, but he denied raping her and 
claimed that he never intended to kill her.  Nonetheless, the jury 
returned guilty verdicts on six counts: attempted second-degree
murder, first-degree assault, third-degree assault, and three counts 
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.22
At sentencing, the court acknowledged that Minnesota
Statutes section 609.342 (first-degree criminal sexual conduct) 
prescribes a maximum of thirty years imprisonment, a $40,000 fine, 
or both, but noted that under certain circumstances section
609.108 increases the maximum time of imprisonment for a
“patterned sex offender.”23  The sentencing court then found, 
20. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 546-47.
21. Id. at 547.
22. Id.
23. Id. Section 609.108, subdivision 1(a) makes doubling the presumptive
sentence mandatory if:
(1)  the court is imposing an executed sentence, based on a sentencing
guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence or a dispositional
departure for aggravating circumstances or a mandatory minimum 
sentence, on a person convicted of committing or attempting to 
commit [first-, second-, third-, or fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct], or on a person convicted of committing [a predatory crime] 
if it reasonably appears to the court that the crime was motivated by the 
offender’s sexual impulses or was part of a predatory pattern of
behavior that had criminal sexual conduct as its goal;
(2) the court finds that the offender is a danger to public safety; and
(3) the court finds that the offender needs long-term treatment or 
supervision beyond the presumptive term of imprisonment and
supervised release.  The finding must be based on a professional 
assessment by an examiner experienced in evaluating sex offenders 
that concludes that the offender is a patterned sex offender.
MINN. STAT. § 609.108, subd. 1(a) (2001).  Pursuant to subdivision 2 of the statute, 
the maximum may be increased:
If the fact-finder determines, at the time of the trial or the guilty plea, 
that a predatory offense was motivated by, committed in the course of, 
or committed in furtherance of sexual contact or penetration, as 
defined in section 609.341, and the court is imposing a sentence under 
subdivision 1, the statutory maximum imprisonment penalty for the 
5
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pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.108, (1) that
Grossman’s actions were part of a pattern of behavior that had 
criminal sexual conduct as its goal and were motivated by his sexual 
impulses, (2) that he was a danger to public safety, and (3) that he 
needs long-term treatment or supervision beyond the presumptive 
term of imprisonment or supervised relief.24  In addition, the court 
found that the record was “filled with aggravating circumstances.”25
Thereafter, the court sentenced Grossman to the enhanced
maximum prison term under Minnesota Statutes section 609.108: 
forty years.26
Grossman appealed the forty-year sentence.  He argued that 
Minnesota Statutes section 609.108, as applied, violated the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Apprendi that any fact
increasing the maximum penalty for a crime must be proven to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
agreed and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to 
impose a maximum sentence of thirty years imprisonment.27  The 
appellate court reasoned that the enhancement rested on findings 
that must be made by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.28  Because section 609.108 sanctioned the sentencing court’s 
imposition of the enhanced sentence based on its own findings, the 
court concluded that it ran afoul of Apprendi.29
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the state took the 
position that section 609.108, subdivision 1, did not actually
authorize the sentencing court to increase the maximum penalty.
Rather, the state argued it was the jury’s finding under subdivision 
2—that the offense “was motivated by, committed in the course of, 
or committed in furtherance of sexual contact or penetration,”—
that authorizes application of the sentencing enhancement.30  The 
court recognized that subdivision 1 did not by its own terms
offense is 40 years, notwithstanding the statutory maximum
imprisonment penalty otherwise provided for the offense.
Id. at subd. (2).
24. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 547.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. State v. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d 394, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
28. Id. at 398.
29. Id.
30. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 549-50 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.108, subd. 2 
(2001)).
6
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authorize the enhanced penalty.  Similarly, the court acknowledged 
that sexual penetration is an element of first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct, and was therefore implicit in the jury’s guilty verdict.  The 
state’s call for the court to isolate the sexual penetration
requirement, however, was rejected.31
The Grossman court, looking exclusively at subdivision 2,
explained that “the jury’s finding of sexual penetration did not, by 
itself, expose Grossman to an increased sentence.  Section 609.108, 
subdivision 2, contains the additional mandate that ‘the court is 
imposing a sentence under subdivision 1.’”32  Subdivision 1, in turn, 
applies if the sentencing judge makes a series of findings by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  In order to apply the enhanced 
sentence, then, the sentencing court must have satisfied “two 
conditions precedent: (1) the jury had to find sexual contact or 
penetration; and (2) the court had to make the findings required 
by subdivision 1.  Both the finding of the jury and those of the 
court were necessary, but neither was sufficient.”33  The state’s 
interpretation would separate the two conditions and ignore the 
use of the conjunctive “and.”  The Grossman court refused to 
disregard the plain and unambiguous language of subdivision 2.34
Moreover, like New Jersey in Apprendi, Minnesota argued that 
the factors considered by the sentencing court were traditional 
sentencing factors, as opposed to elements of the offense, because 
they focused on the defendant rather than the offense.35  The 
factors were, therefore, appropriately within the purview of the 
sentencing court.  The Minnesota Supreme Court quickly disposed 
of this contention by referencing the U.S. Supreme Court’s
observation that such an argument is  “nothing more than a
disagreement with the rule we apply today.”36
The Minnesota court signaled its agreement with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s admonition that the distinction between
“elements” and “sentencing factors” was “constitutionally novel and 
31. Id. at 550.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001) 
and Kersten v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 874-75 (Minn. 
2000)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 550-51 and n.2 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492).
7
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elusive.”37  The Minnesota court embraced the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s focus on the practical effect of the required findings—
whether they would increase the maximum penalty—as opposed to 
determining whether they were traditionally considered elements 
or sentencing factors.38  The court concluded:
[T]he fact that the findings listed in Minnesota Statutes § 
609.108, subd. 1, are of a kind traditionally left to the 
sentencing court rather than the jury is simply not
relevant to the constitutional issue at hand.  The effect of 
the sentencing court’s findings, when coupled with the 
jury’s finding of sexual penetration, was to increase by 10 
years the prison sentence to which Grossman was exposed.
Due process requires that each of these findings be made 
by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.39
The Minnesota Supreme Court, like the court of appeals, 
remanded the case to the trial court for imposition of the
maximum sentence of thirty years in prison pursuant to Minnesota 
Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 2.40  The court thought it 
“clear that Minnesota threatened [Grossman] with . . . additional 
pains . . . if the conditions of Minn. Stat. § 609.108, subd. 2, were 
satisfied.”41  Therefore, “‘the procedural safeguards designed to 
protect [Grossman] from unwarranted pains should apply equally’ 
to all of the facts Minnesota has singled out for enhanced
punishment.”42  Finally, although Grossman challenged the
patterned sex offender statute as applied in his particular case, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court noted its “doubts as to whether there 
37. Id. at 550 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
38. Id. at 550-51.  The Minnesota court also embraced the Supreme Court’s 
definition of the terms:
The term [“sentencing factor”] appropriately describes a circumstance, 
which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that 
supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s 
finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.  On the 
other hand, when the term “sentence enhancement” is used to
describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory
sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.  Indeed, it fits 
squarely within the usual definition of an “element” of the offense.
Id. at 550 n.2 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
39. Id. at 551.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476) (alteration in original).
8
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are any circumstances under which subdivision 2 could be
constitutionally applied.”43
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW
In order to appreciate Grossman and, more generally, the 
sentencing laws in Minnesota, it is necessary to be familiar with 
some of the key recent decisions from both the state and federal 
courts.  A thorough exploration of the jurisprudence of criminal 
sentencing may be found elsewhere.  What follows is a brief
summation of the law in four major areas affected by the decision 
in Apprendi, as it has developed since the decision: (1)  the federal 
drug laws and mandatory minimums; (2) recidivism statutes; (3) 
retroactivity; and (4) the death penalty.
A. The Federal Drug Laws and Mandatory Minimums
The federal drug laws were some of the first to be scrutinized 
after Apprendi was decided.  21 U.S.C. § 841 makes it illegal to 
possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute.  § 
841(b) then specifies the penalty range depending on the quantity 
of the controlled substance involved.  The penalty can reach a 
maximum of life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(B).  If a specific 
quantity is not proven, § 841(b)(1)(C) allows for the imposition of 
a penalty of up to twenty years in prison.  Prior to the decision in 
Apprendi, the United States Courts of Appeals had uniformly
concluded “the amount of controlled substance ‘involved’ was a 
sentencing factor for the judge to decide, not an element of the 
offense that had to be charged and found by a jury by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”44  After Apprendi was decided, this approach 
necessarily changed.45  Currently, in order to sentence a defendant 
under § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the quantity must be charged in the 
indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.46
43. Id. at n.3.
44. Michaels, supra note 3, at 322.
45. See United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000); see
also United States v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (extending the reasoning 
in § 841 cases to § 960, which prohibits the importation of controlled substances, 
based on the parallel structure of the two provisions).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156-58 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“Thus, if a specific threshold quantity of drugs is not found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, a judicial finding of that fact increases the allowable penalty 
9
Hallstrom: State v. Grossman: The Minnesota Supreme Court Applies Apprendi t
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL HALLSTROM GROSSMAN.DOC 10/28/2002 10:50 PM
420 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
At least that was commentators’ initial inclination.47  Less than 
a month after Apprendi was decided, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Aguayo-
Delgado.48 Aguayo-Delgado was the first in a long line of cases from 
the various courts of appeals to hold that it was not a violation of 
Apprendi for the sentencing court to rely upon a finding of drug 
quantity “not charged in the indictment or found by the jury to 
have been beyond a reasonable doubt”49 as long as the court 
sentenced the defendant to less than 20 years, which is the
maximum for a violation of the statute simpliciter pursuant to § 
841(b)(1)(C).50  The rationale for this outcome is found in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,51 a case seemingly at odds with, but 
ultimately approved of by, the Apprendi majority.52
McMillan upheld a provision of Pennsylvania’s Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act imposing a minimum sentence of five 
years for certain crimes “if the sentencing judge found, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant ‘visibly
possessed a firearm’ during the offense.”53  Although the Apprendi
Court explicitly indicated its approval of McMillan, Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky noted the tension between the two cases:
If Apprendi is read literally, it applies only when the
punishment is greater than the statutory maximum for the 
offense.  In other words, it has no application when the 
sentence is within the range prescribed by law.  Yet its 
central rationale—that it is wrong to convict a person of 
one crime and impose punishment for another—logically
applies to factors used to enhance penalties within the 
statutory range.54
beyond that authorized by the facts found by the jury alone.”).
47. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 3, at 322; Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Aprés Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2000).
48. 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000).
49. Id. at 934.
50. E.g., United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Rodgers, 245 F.3d 961, 965-68 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 
122 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 238 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000).
51. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
52. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13.
53. Lewis, supra note 5, at 609 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81).
54. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 104.  “Whether one raises the floor or 
raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that the defendant is exposed to 
10
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Despite the inconsistency between the rationale in Apprendi and the 
holding in McMillan, the general consensus is that unless and until 
the U.S. Supreme Court indicates otherwise, a sentence that falls 
within the range authorized by the statute charged in the
indictment will not violate Apprendi.55  This was the conclusion 
arrived at by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. McCoy,56
which affirmed the trial court’s imposition of a prison term four 
times longer than the presumptive sentence because it “did not 
exceed the statutory maximum of 25 years for second-degree
criminal sexual assault.”57
To make matters worse, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case 
decided this past term,58 failed to completely resolve the question of 
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes after Apprendi.  In Harris
v. United States, the Court presumably intended to provide a final 
answer to the question of whether the rationale articulated in 
Apprendi would extend to circumstances where a defendant was 
sentenced based on facts not charged in the indictment or found 
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt but where the sentence did 
greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed.”  Harris v. United States, 122 S. 
Ct. 2406, 2426 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2414 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); United States 
v. Foster, 2002 WL 1808434 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2002).
The vast majority of appeals being brought under Apprendi have been 
quickly dismissed because they don’t involve sentences that extend 
beyond the statutory maximum.  Samuel Buffone of the Washington,
D.C., office of Boston’s Ropes & Gray says the flood of failed appeals 
reflects an expectation among defense lawyers that future Apprendi-
related rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court will be coming.  Certainly 
those people who have raised the issues in pending appeals will be in a 
much better position than those who don’t . . . .
David E. Rovella, A Looming ‘Apprendi’ Tsunami?, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at A1 
(internal quotations omitted).
56. 631 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
57. Id. at 451. See also King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 2002); Archer v. 
State, No. C3-02-82, 2002 WL 1424555 (Minn. Ct. App. July 2, 2002); Ashby v. 
State, No. C2-01-1679, 2002 WL 977444 (Minn. Ct. App. May 14, 2002); Ledden v. 
State, No. C4-01-1196, 2002 WL 171899 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2002); State v. 
Kurowski, No. C6-01-552, 2002 WL 109356 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2002); State v. 
Branch, No. C8-01-374, 2001 WL 1646508 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001); State v. 
Wasson, No. C5-01-1014, 2001 WL 1530255 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec 4, 2001); State v. 
Hood, No. C9-00-2088, 2001 WL 1083916 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2001); Jackson 
v. State, No. CX-01-36, 2001 WL 800039 (Minn. Ct. App. July 17, 2001); Beck v. 
State, No. C4-00-1740, 2001 WL 682738 (Minn. Ct. App. June 19, 2001); State v. 
Wasson, No. C4-00-443, 2000 WL 1617777 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2000).
58. Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406 (2002).
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not exceed the maximum penalty authorized by law.  The resulting 
4-1-4 decision, however, while maintaining the status quo, failed to 
command a majority who saw a principled distinction between 
Apprendi and McMillan.59
B. Recidivism Statutes60
Another exception to the general rule laid down in Apprendi
was made for recidivism statutes.  Justice Stevens’s articulation of 
the holding in Apprendi famously declares that “[o]ther than the fact 
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”61 Apprendi’s
protections are unnecessary in such a context “because another 
jury had already had the opportunity to pass upon the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”62  Nonetheless, Justice Stevens 
59. In Harris, the Court upheld the imposition of a mandatory minimum 
sentence imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (mandating graduated 
minimum sentences based upon a sentencing court’s findings regarding firearm 
use or possession during a drug trafficking offense). Id. at 2415.  A majority of the 
Court held that Congress made brandishing a gun an element of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A) rather than a sentencing factor, and reaffirmed the validity of 
McMillan. Id. at 2414-15.  Justice Breyer, however, did not agree with the 
reasoning of Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia.  While Justice 
Kennedy’s leading opinion announced that “McMillan and Apprendi are
consistent,” Justice Breyer could not distinguish the cases “in terms of logic.” Id. at 
2414, 2420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).  Rather, he 
thought “extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums would have adverse
practical, as well as legal, consequences.” Id. at 2420-21.  Thus, while five Justices 
voted in favor of maintaining McMillan’s continued validity, it appears that five 
also recognize the inherent conflict between the reasoning in Apprendi and
McMillan (and consequently in Harris as well).
60. Recidivism statutes take a defendant’s prior convictions into account,
usually as a sentencing factor, but conceivably as an element of the offense. See
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).
61. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
62. Lewis, supra note 5, at 617.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals reached the 
same conclusion in State v. Hopkins, No. C4-01-923, 2002 WL 980867 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 14, 2002), and Folden v. State, No. Co-01-31, 2001 WL 800025 (Minn. 
Ct. App. July 17, 2001). Relying on the explicit language in Apprendi, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held judicial finding of “the fact of a prior
conviction . . . may serve to increase a criminal defendant’s sentence without 
violating his or her due process rights.” Hopkins, 2002 WL 980867, at *5. It is 
significant, though, that the “Minnesota Supreme Court has previously held that 
prior convictions resulting in increased penalties must be set out in an indictment 
and ultimately decided by the adjudicatory jury.”  State v. Stewart, 486 N.W.2d 444, 
446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the fact of a prior conviction of a “heinous 
12
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suggested the possibility that United States v. Almendarez-Torres,63 the 
case holding prior convictions were sentencing factors that did not 
have to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, was 
decided incorrectly.64
In Almendarez-Torres, the Court rejected an invitation to “simply 
adopt a rule that any significant increase in a statutory maximum 
sentence would trigger a Constitutional ‘elements’ requirement.”65
In so doing, the court relied heavily upon McMillan’s finding that 
mandatory minimums were not constitutionally infirm.66
Furthermore, the Court thought “such a rule would seem
anomalous in light of existing case law that permits a judge, rather 
than a jury, to determine the existence of factors that can make a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty, a punishment far more 
severe than that faced by petitioner here.”67  It is no longer 
constitutionally permissible for a judge to make the crucial factual 
findings subjecting a defendant to the death penalty.68  It is unclear 
to what extent this change may affect the Court’s conclusion were it 
to revisit the issue, especially since McMillan is (apparently) still 
crime” as defined in Minnesota Statutes section 609.106 “must be presented to the 
grand jury in order for it determine whether probable cause exists to indict a 
defendant for first degree murder.”).  Therefore, in Minnesota it may be necessary 
to charge certain prior convictions in the indictment and prove them to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see infra
Part IV.
63. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
64. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489.  Justice Thomas would go further, requiring 
evidence of past crimes to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, just like 
any other fact that could result in an increased sentence. Id. at 501-02 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“[A] ‘crime’ includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing 
or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment).”).
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, argued the 
constitutional “‘right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury,’ has no intelligible content 
unless it means that all the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant 
to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.” Id. at 499 (Scalia, 
J., concurring).  Justice Scalia seems to have retreated moderately from this view, 
given his alignment with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Harris. See 122 S. Ct. at 2419 
(“Within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict, however, the political system
may channel judicial discretion—and rely upon judicial expertise—by requiring 
defendants to serve minimum terms after judges make certain factual findings.”).
65. 523 U.S. at 247.
66. Id. at 246-47.
67. Id. at 247 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647 (1990)). Walton has 
since been overruled. See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002); infra Part III.D.
68. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
13
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good law.69  It is clear, however, that until the U.S. Supreme Court 
decides to address the issue directly, Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres
will continue to govern the lower courts’ approach to recidivism 
statutes.70  Thus, for the time being, federal law does not require a 
defendant’s prior convictions to be charged in the indictment or 
proven to a jury.
C. Retroactivity
When a defendant challenges his sentence under Apprendi or 
its progeny on direct appeal, he must survive harmless error review 
if the claim was properly reserved,71 and the more demanding plain 
error review if the claim was not.72  These doctrines may prove 
significant obstacles to relief, but at least the opportunity to present 
an Apprendi-based challenge is available.  The vast majority of those 
who could potentially benefit from the Court’s decision, however, 
have exhausted their direct appeals.  Those individuals must 
pursue relief through collateral review.  In Teague v. Lane,73 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held “new rules” of criminal procedure should not 
be applied retroactively unless (1) they protect certain conduct 
from punishment altogether; or (2) they are “watershed ruling[s]
69. See supra Part III.A.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 708 (8th Cir. 2001) (“It 
is the law in this circuit, until the Supreme Court chooses to revisit the question of 
recidivism statutes, that Apprendi does not require the ‘fact’ of prior convictions to 
be pled and proved to a jury.”) (citing cases from other circuits holding the same); 
State v. Hopkins, 2002 WL 980867 at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 14, 2002).
71. King & Klein, supra note 47, at 332.
72. Id. See United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002) (holding the 
defendant could not survive plain error review because, due to the overwhelming 
evidence against him, the increased maximum sentence did not seriously affect 
the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings); United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (describing the court of appeals’ “limited power to correct 
errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court”). But see
United States v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding, in a case similar to 
Cotton, that the plain error standard was met because there was no overwhelming 
evidence against Doe, like there was against Cotton). Cotton, the first of the 
Court’s three post-Apprendi cases to be decided this past term, was somewhat more 
limited in scope than the others, yet it considered important procedural and 
jurisdictional questions.  In addition to addressing the standard of review when the 
error is not raised at trial, it also held that a defective indictment under Apprendi
(i.e., an indictment failing to set out all the facts that may lead to an enhanced 
sentence) will “not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” Cotton, 122 S. 
Ct. at 1785.
73. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
14
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central to an accurate determination of guilt that ‘alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the 
fairness of the proceeding.’”74  It cannot be suggested that Apprendi
protects specific conduct from punishment, so if it is to be applied 
retroactively, it must be a new rule falling into the second
exception.
In order to be considered a “new rule,” a decision must not be 
“dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.”75  This does not mean the Court must 
overturn a previous case or set forth a rule never previously
contemplated.  Rather, clarification of an existing, but confusing, 
rule may qualify as a new rule under Teague.76  “That Apprendi is a 
‘new’ rule under Teague, not ‘dictated’ by prior precedent, is amply 
illustrated by the debate between the justices about its consistency 
with prior decisions.”77
The more difficult question is whether Apprendi rose to the 
level of a “watershed” development in the law of criminal
procedure.  When Apprendi was decided, many commentators saw 
the decision as one of great importance that would fundamentally 
change the face of criminal sentencing.78  Given Justice O’Connor’s 
dissenting opinion explicitly referring to the decision as a
“watershed change,”79 it is no surprise that some commentators and 
courts saw the decision as one warranting retroactive application 
74. King & Klein, supra note 47, at 333 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 
(1990)).
75. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
76. Lewis, supra note 5, at 614.  “Teague serves to ensure that gradual
developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later 
used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when entered.” Sawyer, 497 U.S. 
at 234.
77. King & Klein, supra note 47, at 333.
78. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 104; J. Stephen Welch, Apprendi 
v. New Jersey: Watershed Ruling for the New Millennium?, S.C. LAW., Apr. 2001, at 37; 
cf. Standen, supra note 12, at 779-84 (concluding that although Apprendi would 
have a limited direct effect on formal procedure, it would have a significant impact
on criminal justice more generally because it exacerbates a trend towards greater 
prosecutorial discretion in sentencing); accord Susan N. Herman, Applying
Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 615 (2002); Supreme Contradiction, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at A18 
(referring to Apprendi as “articulat[ing] a sweeping principle”)[hereinafter Supreme
Contradiction].
79. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Today, in what will 
surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law . . . .”).
15
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on collateral review pursuant to Teague’s second exception.80  The 
majority of courts, however, have come to the contrary conclusion.
The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is representative:
To fall within the exception, the rule must impart a 
fundamental procedural right that, like Gideon, is a
necessary component of a fair trial.  “It is . . . not enough 
under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving 
the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that
qualifies under this exception must not only improve 
accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding.”  One need only peruse the cases, and the 
“new rules” therein, in which the Supreme Court has 
rejected the watershed exception’s applicability to
appreciate how absolutely fundamental the right must be 
to satisfy the exception. Apprendi appears no more
“important” to a fair trial than rules previously addressed 
by the Court, including the rule announced in Batson v. 
Kentucky, which the Court refused to apply retroactively in 
Teague.
Permitting a judge-found fact to affect the sentence 
imposed after a valid conviction, even if it is found under 
a more lenient standard, cannot be said to have resulted 
in a fundamentally unfair criminal proceeding. As the 
Fifth Circuit has noted, “one can easily envision a system 
of ‘ordered liberty’ in which certain elements of a crime 
can or must be proved to a judge, not to the jury,” and it is 
not as though defendants have been foreclosed prior to 
Apprendi from challenging facts that were previously
thought to be sentencing considerations.81
80. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 109 F. Supp.2d 1059, 1065 (D. Minn. 
2001); People v. Rush, 757 N.E.2d 88, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Huigens, supra note
14, at 388; Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and Criminal Law Decisions, 28 
PEPP. L. REV. 517, 523 (2001); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence 
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L. J. 1097, 1145-46 n.313 (2001); 
Welch, supra note 78, at 37.
81. United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); accord San-Miguel v. Dove, 291 F.3d 257 (4th 
Cir. 2002); Goode v. United States, 39 Fed. Appx. 152 (6th Cir. 2002)
(unpublished opinion); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 
2002); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2001).  Many scholars 
agree.  Professors Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein have argued that,
unlike depravations of counsel, [the rule of Apprendi] does not protect 
the blameless from punishment, but instead protects the
16
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Moreover, a number of courts have held that only the U.S.
Supreme Court may declare a decision retroactive, at least with 
respect to successive collateral attacks.82  Therefore, unless there is 
a clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court of retroactivity for 
the rule announced in Apprendi or some future permutation 
thereof— potentially Ring v. Arizona83—it seems highly unlikely any 
court will sanction its application on primary or successive
collateral review.
D. The Death Penalty
Ring v. Arizona,84 the United States Supreme Court’s most 
reaching post-Apprendi decision, is of relatively little significance in 
Minnesota because Minnesota is one of twelve states that do not 
employ capital punishment.85  As noted in the previous sections, 
however, the reasoning underlying Ring may have an impact in 
other Apprendi-related cases.  Therefore, it is important to
understand the Court’s holding in Ring, and what compelled the 
extension of Apprendi to capital sentencing on the same day it was 
held not to apply to mandatory minimums.86
Ring is, of course, noteworthy outside of the narrow context of 
the issues raised herein because it held Arizona’s capital
unquestionably blameworthy from unauthorized amounts of
punishment.  The decision does no more to “alter our understanding 
of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the 
proceeding” than other rules rejected under the exception, including 
the ruling in Batson v. Kentucky.  Indeed, the Court has yet to find any 
ruling that qualifies for this exception, and it seems unlikely to us that 
the Apprendi rule will be the first.
King & Kline, supra note 47, at 333; accord Lewis, supra note 5, at 613-16.
82. Talbott v. State, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (“If the Supreme Court 
ultimately declares that Apprendi applies retroactively on collateral attack, we will 
authorize successive collateral review of cases to which Apprendi applies.  Until 
then prisoners should hold their horses and stop wasting everyone’s time with 
futile applications.”).
83. See infra Part III.D.
84. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
85. See Death Penalty Information Center, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
86. Some have argued that Harris and Ring are inconsistent. See, e.g., Supreme
Contradiction, supra note 78.  Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this article.  It 
should be noted that in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia articulates a 
defensible position for his decision to join the majority in Ring, while refusing to 
extend Apprendi  to mandatory minimums in Harris. See Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443-45
(Scalia, J., concurring).
17
Hallstrom: State v. Grossman: The Minnesota Supreme Court Applies Apprendi t
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL HALLSTROM GROSSMAN.DOC 10/28/2002 10:50 PM
428 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
punishment system unconstitutional, invalidating the death
sentences of over 150 convicted killers.87  In a nutshell, Ring held 
that a trial judge, sitting alone, could not constitutionally impose 
the death penalty based on his or her own findings of aggravating 
factors.88  Because Arizona’s first-degree murder statute authorized 
a maximum penalty of death only after the finding of an
aggravating circumstance,89 Apprendi forbids that finding from
being made by a judge.  Instead, the presence or absence of any 
aggravating factors must be determined by a jury.90  Otherwise, 
“Apprendi would be reduced to a meaningless and formalistic rule 
of statutory drafting.”91 Ring is particularly significant because the 
case that it overruled, Walton v. Arizona,92 was not only a relatively 
recent decision (it was only twelve years old), but it held the exact 
same capital sentencing statute to be “compatible with the Sixth 
Amendment.”93
Walton held “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the 
specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of 
death be made by the jury.”94  The Walton decision came on the 
heals of Hildwin v. Florida,95 a case upholding Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme in which the jury recommends a sentence of 
either life imprisonment or execution, but does not make any 
findings respecting aggravating circumstances.96  In Jones v. United 
87. While the decision addressed only Arizona’s capital punishment system, it 
will directly affect at least four other states’ death penalty sentencing schemes: 
Idaho, Montana, Colorado, and Nebraska. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Sentencing
Laws Rejected; Top Court Declares Right to have Jury Decide Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB.,
June. 25, 2002, at 1; Associated Press, Court Overturns More Than 150 Judge-Imposed
Death Sentences (June 24, 2002), http://www.truthinjustice.org/ring.htm; David
Lindorff, Another Strike Against the Death Penalty, at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/25/ deathrow/index_np.html
(June 25, 2002).  The decision could conceivably spill over into four other states: 
Florida, Alabama, Indiana, and Delaware.  Associated Press, supra.  In these states, 
juries only recommend whether the sentencing judge should impose a life
sentence or death. Id.  In all, the decision could invalidate nearly eight hundred 
death sentences. Id.
88. 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
89. Id. at 2437, 2443.
90. Id. at 2443.
91. Id. at 2431 (internal quotations omitted).
92. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
93. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2432.
94. 497 U.S. at 648 (internal quotations omitted).
95. 490 U.S. 638 (1989).
96. Id. at 640-41.
18
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States,97 the Court described the decision in Walton as one that
“characterized the finding of aggravating facts falling within the 
traditional scope of capital sentencing as a choice between a
greater and a lesser penalty, not as a process of raising the ceiling 
of the sentencing range available.”98  Even though the Apprendi
court thought its decision could be squared with Walton,99 by the 
time Ring was decided, it was clear that the decisions could not be 
reconciled.100
IV. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Grossman
was, more or less, a straightforward application of Apprendi, I have 
attempted to place the decisions in a broader context.  Keep in 
mind that from the time Apprendi was decided in 2000, thousands 
of cases citing that opinion have issued from state and federal 
courts.101  Those cases, however, can be grouped into a few basic 
categories.  Of the categories set out in Part III, some will be of 
greater importance to those concerned with the development of 
Minnesota’s criminal law and procedure.  For instance, it appears 
the question of Apprendi’s retroactive applicability on collateral 
review has been all but settled.102  If any post-Apprendi decision has 
the potential to upset the status quo in that regard, it is Ring v. 
Arizona.  And, as mentioned before, Ring is of extremely limited 
relevance in capital punishment-free states such as Minnesota.103
One area that may not yet be resolved is that of mandatory 
minimums.  As previously noted, Harris upheld McMillan but did so 
without a majority consensus as to the reasoning.104  Consequently,
it seems likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will revisit the issue 
97. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
98. Id. at 251.
99. “[O]nce a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an 
offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left 
to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, 
ought to be imposed.” Appredi, 530 U.S. at 497.
100. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2432.
101. As of the publication of this article, a search for “Apprendi” in Westlaw’s 
“allcases” database yielded over 4,000 cases, both published and unpublished.
Limiting that search to Minnesota state cases and federal cases having a direct
bearing on Minnesota courts (Westlaw’s “mn-cs-all” database) yielded 255 results.
102. See Moss, 252 F.3d at 999; see generally supra Part III.C.
103. See supra Part III.D.
104. See supra Part III.A.
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before long.  In Harris, Justice Breyer walked a fine line between 
the majority’s conclusion and the dissent’s reasoning.  Although he 
felt the key distinction supporting Justice Kennedy’s opinion was 
logically infirm, he expressed great trepidation over the practical 
impact of extending Apprendi’s rationale to mandatory
minimums.105  Justice Breyer expressed both his disapproval for 
mandatory minimums as a matter of policy as well as his concern
that extending Apprendi would not have the effect of ending their 
use, but instead further disadvantage defendants.106  Legally, Justice 
Breyer is afraid that extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums 
would jeopardize the current system of guided sentencing
discretion.107
It seems quite possible that Justice Breyer’s position in Harris is 
not intractable.  It is not impossible for Apprendi to be applied in a 
manner consistent with guided sentencing schemes such as the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines.108  Justice Breyer has himself 
hinted at the potential for movement in his view in Harris by stating
that he could not “yet” extend Apprendi to mandatory minimum 
sentences.109  The point is this: Given Justice Breyer’s seemingly 
tentative stance, as well as the ever present possibility of a change in 
Court personnel,110 Harris is most likely not the Court’s last word on 
105. 122 S. Ct. at 2420-21 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) 
(“And because I believe that extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums would 
have adverse practical, as well as legal consequences, I cannot yet accept its rule.”).
106. Id. at 2420-22.  Indeed, Justice Breyer argues that by taking away from the 
judge the power to make certain factual determinations, defendants will be forced 
to argue flagrantly inconsistent positions to a jury or stipulate to the triggering 
facts, which only serves to aggrandize the prosecutor’s power. Id. at 2421-22.  For a 
detailed discussion of this particular theory, see generally Bibas, supra note 80.  For 
an excellent rejoinder, see generally Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi
and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2001).
107. Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2421-22; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555-66.
108. See, e.g., Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and 
Elements of a Crime, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1427-38 (2001).
109. 122 S. Ct. at 2421 (emphasis added).  In Apprendi, Justice Breyer
suggested that, given the Court’s decision, mandatory minimum sentencing
“simply encourages any legislature interested in asserting control over the
sentencing process to do so by creating those minimums.”  530 U.S. at 564.  This 
further supports the possibility that he may be willing to reevaluate his position in 
Harris.
110. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Speculation Builds Over Chief Justice Successor,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 2002, at 1; George Watson, The Vacancy, at
http://partners.is.asu.edu/~george/vacancy/vacancy.html (last modified March 
14, 2000).
20
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the subject of mandatory minimums and Apprendi.  Therefore, it is 
as imperative now as it was immediately following Apprendi for 
defense counsel to be “constantly alert and raise every issue that the 
Supreme Court has not definitively decided.”111  Failure to do so 
will risk the application of a more stringent—and potentially fatal—
standard of review.112
In addition, there are a few specific applications of Apprendi
that are of particular importance.  First, there is the question of 
conditional release under Minnesota Statutes section 609.108,
subdivision 6:
At the time of sentencing under subdivision 1, the court 
shall provide that after the offender has completed the 
sentence imposed . . . the commissioner of corrections 
shall place the offender on conditional release for the 
remainder of the statutory maximum period, or for ten 
years, whichever is longer.113
As recently held by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, this provision
has the potential to “allow for both the maximum sentence and a 
conditional release period beyond the maximum.”114  In State v. 
Jones, the defendant was given, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.108, the maximum sentence for third-degree criminal 
sexual conduct: fifteen years imprisonment.  Nonetheless, the 
sentencing court added ten years of conditional release under 
subdivision 6.115  Jones appealed his sentence, arguing that the 
addition of the conditional release exposed him to a greater
sentence than that authorized by law for third-degree criminal 
sexual conduct.116  The appellate court agreed and remanded the 
case for resentencing.
The appellate court rightly concluded that conditional release 
was “an obvious penalty that would allow appellant to invoke 
Apprendi.”117  The court went on to note that while conditional 
release is mandatory, the duration of the conditional release is 
111. John Kenneth Zwerling, Comprendez Apprendi?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309, 
320 (2001) (referring to one of the lessons of the recently decided Apprendi case).
112. Id.; see supra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text.
113. MINN. STAT. § 609.108, subd. 6 (2001).
114. State v. Jones, 647 N.W.2d 540, 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subd. 2.
117. Jones, 647 N.W.2d at 547; see also State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 649
(Minn. 2001) (recognizing conditional release is an aspect of punishment);
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 551 (holding applies to any increase in defendant’s penalty).
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not.118  The court resolved the potential constitutional defects 
raised by concluding that:
[W]here application of the conditional release term and 
the rule forbidding imposition of prison time beyond the 
statutory maximum are in unresolvable conflict, to avoid 
unconstitutional application of law, the district court may 
reduce appellant’s conditional release time to less than 
ten years so that the conditional release time plus the 
incarceration time do not exceed the statutory maximum
of 15 years.119
While this approach is appealing, it conflicts with the clear
language of section 609.108, subdivision 6.  As such, the ultimate 
resolution of this conflict may well require the authoritative
imprimatur of the state’s high court.  Prosecutors and defense 
counsel alike would be wise to keep this in mind as they craft their 
arguments addressing conditional release statutes such as the one 
at issue in Jones.
Furthermore, as noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has previously held that “prior convictions resulting in increased 
penalties must be set out in an indictment and ultimately decided 
by the adjudicatory jury.”120  In State v. Stewart, the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals relied upon State v. Findling121 in holding that
“[e]vidence of a prior conviction of a heinous crime must be 
presented to the grand jury in order for it to determine whether 
probable cause exists to indict a defendant for first degree murder 
punishable by life imprisonment without possibility of release as 
defined by Minnesota Statutes § [609.106].”122  More recently, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court explained that Findling is limited to 
instances where there is “no statutory method to determine the 
enhancement factors.”123  While Findling and Stewart were not 
applicable to the defendant’s argument in State v. Ronquist, it 
appears they still apply to sentencing enhancement provisions like 
those found in Minnesota Statutes section 609.106.  To the extent 
that determination of a “heinous crime” is potentially subject to 
fact determinations, and where there exists no statutorily
118. Jones, 647 N.W.2d at 547-48.
119. Id. at 548.
120. State v. Stewart, 486 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
121. 12 Minn. 413, 144 N.W. 142 (1913).
122. Stewart, 486 N.W.2d at 448.
123. State v. Ronquist, 600 N.W.2d 444, 449 n.26 (Minn. 1999).
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articulated method by which to determine the enhancement
factors, Stewart should still apply.  So, despite the fact that Apprendi
explicitly carves out an exception for recidivism statutes, under 
Minnesota law there will be occasions where Apprendi must be 
extended to the fact of a prior conviction.
Finally, it will be important to watch the legislative response to 
Apprendi and its progeny.  Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg has 
suggested that Apprendi “will serve as a legislative drafting guide.”124
The problem, as identified by numerous commentators, is that “the 
procedural due process limitations on sentencing that are apparent 
in Apprendi can be avoided fairly easily by a legislature.”125  In fact, it 
has been predicted that Apprendi will eventually “bring about the 
end of sentencing guidelines systems because ‘tough-on-crime’
legislators will favor the post-Apprendi world and enact legislation to 
take advantage of it.”126  This is compounded by the Court’s
decision in Harris:
[B]y shifting statutory maximums and minimums around, 
Congress will be able to artfully modify the instances in 
which defendants do and do not get a jury—and thus to 
control when the Sixth Amendment applies.  But, of 
course, the fair trial/jury trial right is supposed to be a 
check on Congress, not something it can easily circumvent 
by redrafting legislation a different way . . . .127
This possibility did not slip by the members of the Apprendi
majority undetected.  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
addressed the argument as articulated by Justice O’Connor in her 
124. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 249 (2001).
125. Id. at 250.  As explained by Professor Alan Michaels, using the statute in 
Apprendi as an example,
New Jersey could also try to respond by revising the statutory penalty 
for second-degree offenses from five to twenty years, while enacting a 
separate provision that forbids the judge from imposing a sentence of 
more than ten years unless the judge finds that the defendant
committed the offense with a biased purpose.
Michaels, supra note 3, at 320.  This “Revised Penalty Statute” makes only a slight 
semantic change, yet achieves precisely the same result rejected in Apprendi
without offending Apprendi’s rule as set out in that case. Id. at 321.
126. Standen, supra note 12, at 784.
127. Mark H. Allenbaugh, Why a Recent Supreme Court Decision Inexplicably will 
Continue to Allow Mandatory Minimum Sentences to be Based on Hearsay Evidence Never 
Presented to a Jury or Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, FINDLAW’S WRIT, ¶19 (June 27, 
2002), at http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20020627_allenbaugh.html.
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dissent:
The principal dissent would reject the Court’s rule as a
“meaningless formalism,” because it can conceive of
hypothetical statutes that would comply with the rule and 
achieve the same result as the New Jersey statue.  While a 
State could, hypothetically, undertake to revise its entire 
criminal code in the manner the dissent suggests—
extending all statutory maximum sentences to, for
example, 50 years and giving judges guided discretion as 
to a few specially selected factors within that range—this
possibility seems remote.  Among other reasons, structural 
democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures
from enacting penal statutes that expose every defendant 
convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a
maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the
legislature’s judgment, generally proportional to the
crime.  This is as it should be.  Our rule ensures that a 
State is obliged “to make its choices concerning the
substantive content of its criminal laws with full awareness 
of the consequences, unable to mask substantive policy 
choices” of exposing all who are convicted to the
maximum sentence it provides.  So exposed, “[t]he
political check on potentially harsh legislative action is 
more likely to operate.”128
Although there is some empirical evidence that Justice Stevens is 
correct--that the worst case scenarios predicted will not come 
about129--Professor Joseph L. Hoffman has identified a key
difference: the class of persons affected by Apprendi and its progeny 
lack the type of political power required to turn the political 
process into an effective “structural democratic constraint.”130  In 
the event that such constraints fail, Justice Stevens has indicated the 
Court “would be required to question whether the revision was 
128. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16 (internal citations omitted).
129. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 255, 272-75 (2001) (considering the implications of Apprendi
through the lens of a line of Supreme Court decisions addressing similar
principles in the context of affirmative defenses).
130. “Under Apprendi, the class of persons affected by the creation of
‘sentencing factors’ typically does not include legislators or their families or 
friends.  This is because most such ‘sentencing factors’ are enhancements—meaning
that they merely enhance the sentence for someone who already has been convicted 
of a crime.” Id. at 274-75.
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constitutional under this Court’s prior decisions.”131  And this 
second, legal check on the legislative branch’s ability to take 
“particularly draconian efforts to impose punishment” means the 
criminal bar will yet have a significant roll to play in the continuing 
effort to identify the limits on legislative hegemony over substantive 
criminal law.132
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Grossman
this term was anything but an earth-shattering decision.  It affirmed 
a well-reasoned opinion by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which 
in turn held a portion of the Minnesota patterned and predatory 
sex offender statute unconstitutional.  While a majority of the cases 
to be brought in state and federal courts after Apprendi have not 
alleged clear, or even arguable, constitutional violations, the
provision at issue in Grossman is clearly inconsistent with the rule 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey.  Although the decision may not have been exciting, or even 
challenging, it was important.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
indicated its willingness to enter a complicated and vital debate 
about the limits on the legislative branch’s control over the
substance of the criminal law.  This is significant because it will 
require the court, from time to time, to invalidate democratically 
enacted and politically popular laws.  And because of the political 
powerlessness of many of those who will feel the brunt of those 
sanctions, the court’s role is all the more important.
Apprendi-based challenges lie hidden in the criminal statutes.
In this article I have identified just a few of the ways the complex 
amalgamation of laws we call the criminal code may present
situations where they cannot be applied consistently with the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Apprendi and its progeny.
But as always, it is the practicing attorney who can and must be the 
131. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16.
132. As stated by Professors Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein, “We believe this 
second admonishment is a viable threat, and will soon become the focus of intense 
litigation.”  King & Klein, supra note 14, at 1487.  It is imperative for anyone 
practicing criminal law to familiarize themselves with the impressively well-
developed due process analysis set out by Professors King and Klein.  The
Supreme Court, it would seem, already has. See Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 
2406, 2416 (2002) (citing Professors King and Klein’s Essential Elements for its
historical analysis).
25
Hallstrom: State v. Grossman: The Minnesota Supreme Court Applies Apprendi t
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL HALLSTROM GROSSMAN.DOC 10/28/2002 10:50 PM
436 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
driving force behind the efforts to bring our criminal laws into 
compliance with the demands of the Constitution.
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